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DOCTRINE AND HOURLY MATTERS 
Peter W. Rogers 
ABSTRACT—When a law firm goes out of business, who is entitled to the 
earnings that the partners generate from unfinished, pending hourly 
matters? Most states that have addressed the issue hold that unless the 
partners agree otherwise, all profits from unfinished business belong not to 
the partners who complete the matters but, rather, to all partners of the 
former law firm. This so-called unfinished business doctrine has been 
criticized for impinging clients’ choice of counsel because it creates 
financial disincentives that may encourage attorneys to withdraw from 
pending matters, given that they would need to share earnings with former 
partners. The law is unsettled in New York, and in 2012, two judges in the 
Southern District of New York examined whether the unfinished business 
doctrine applies to hourly matters. They arrived at different conclusions, 
creating a split in the district. This Note argues that the unfinished business 
doctrine applies to hourly matters because it does not violate public policy 
by improperly deterring attorneys from practicing law. Nevertheless, this 
Note proposes a statutory amendment for New York and certain other 
states that would mitigate the financial disincentives that the unfinished 
business doctrine creates by allowing partners to earn reasonable 
compensation for winding up unfinished business. 
 
AUTHOR—J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2014; 
M.S., Accounting, Babson College, 2008; B.S., Babson College, 2008. I 
would like to express my gratitude to Professors Allan Horwich and 
Robert Hillman for their guidance. I also thank the talented editors of the 
Northwestern University Law Review, especially Kelly Hollingsworth and 
Sam Scarcello, for their invaluable comments. Finally, I am grateful to my 
parents, grandmother, and sister, as well as E.C.B., for their unconditional 
love and support and for motivating me to do my best. 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
312 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 312 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE ...................................... 314 
A.  Partnership Dissolution Versus Partner Withdrawal ................................. 315 
B.  How the Unfinished Business Doctrine Affects Client Choice .................... 319 
II.  THE SPLIT WITHIN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ................................. 322 
A.  Development Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP .. 323 
B.  Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP ................................................................. 328 
III.  APPLYING THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE TO HOURLY MATTERS ............... 333 
A.  Why the Unfinished Business Doctrine Applies to Hourly Matters ............. 333 
B.  The Difference Between Hourly and Contingent Fee Matters .................... 336 




Economic conditions over the past several years have forced courts 
and partners of law firms to face an issue that they may have never 
contemplated: when a law firm goes out of business, who is entitled to the 
earnings that the partners subsequently generate from unfinished, pending 
matters—and does the answer depend on whether a matter is billed on 
contingency or by the hour? 
If a partnership agreement is silent on the issue of unfinished business, 
state partnership law provides the answer. However, the law, which has 
multi-million dollar implications,1 is unsettled in New York. This is rather 
ironic, considering that New York is home to many of the most interesting 
and sophisticated legal matters, including the recent bankruptcy of one of 
the largest law firms, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP.2 
Most states that have addressed the issue hold that the unfinished 
business of a former law firm belongs to the former partnership unless the 
 
1 The unfinished business of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP was valued at approximately $60 million. 
Casey Sullivan & Nate Raymond, Ex-Dewey Partners Agree to Pay at Least $50 Million in Settlement, 
REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2012, 1:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/17/us-dewey-settle-idUS
BRE87F1EE20120817. Because the Dewey partnership agreement did not waive the partnership’s 
rights to unfinished business, New York partnership law controls. See Motion of the Official Committee 
of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to §§ 1103(c) and 1109(b), Granting Leave, 
Standing and Authority to Prosecute and, if Appropriate, Settle Certain Claims on Behalf of the 
Debtor’s Estate, Exhibit A at 25–36, In re Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, 478 B.R. 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 12-12321 (MG)), ECF No. 628. Though many former Dewey partners have agreed to 
settlements, some settlements with Dewey’s largest earners do not resolve claims involving unfinished 
business. Dewey & LeBoeuf, 478 B.R. at 633. 
2 See Jennifer Smith & Ashby Jones, Storied Law Firm Dewey Files Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., May 
29, 2012, at A1. 
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partners agree otherwise.3 The rationale is that because partners owe 
fiduciary duties to one another as they wind up the firm, the partners who 
continue to complete the unfinished business do so for the benefit of all 
former partners.4 Jewel v. Boxer,5 a California appellate court opinion, is 
the seminal case that embraced this principle, often referred to as the 
unfinished business or Jewel doctrine. The doctrine has been criticized for 
impinging clients’ choice of counsel because it creates financial 
disincentives that may encourage attorneys to withdraw from client 
matters, given that the attorneys would need to share earnings with former 
partners.6 Because Jewel dealt with unfinished business billed on 
contingency, litigants have argued that the doctrine does not apply to 
matters billed by the hour.7 
In 2012, two judges in the Southern District of New York, writing 
opinions for separate cases, thoroughly examined whether the doctrine 
applies to hourly matters.8 They arrived at different conclusions, creating a 
split in the district. The point of contention between the two opinions 
primarily involves the weight each judge gave to the New York Court of 
Appeals’ interpretation of an ethics rule prohibiting agreements that restrict 
an attorney’s ability to practice law.9 The first judge to address the issue 
narrowly read the Court of Appeals’ interpretation and held that the 
unfinished business doctrine encompasses hourly matters.10 The second 
judge gave a broader reading to the interpretation and held that the doctrine 
does not apply to hourly matters because such an application violates 
public policy.11 Both judges certified their decisions for interlocutory 
 
3 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale (In re Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R. 
391, 408–09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing jurisdictions that have adopted the unfinished business 
doctrine). 
4 See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1984). 
5 203 Cal. Rptr. 13. 
6 See generally Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law 
Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1597, 1597–619 
(1985). 
7 See, e.g., Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 738–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dev. 
Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997); Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 
LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 333 n.20 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009); 
Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 407; Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 1993). 
8 See Geron, 476 B.R. at 738–43; Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 331–46. 
9 Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989). 
10 See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 340–44, 349. 
11 See Geron, 476 B.R. at 740, 742–43. 
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appeal to the Second Circuit,12 which in turn certified questions to the New 
York Court of Appeals.13 
This split in the Southern District of New York and the pendency of 
the certified questions before the New York Court of Appeals present an 
opportunity to explore whether the unfinished business doctrine should 
apply to hourly matters. This Note argues that the doctrine applies to hourly 
matters because it does not violate public policy by improperly deterring 
attorneys from practicing law. Ultimately, I propose a statutory amendment 
that New York and certain other states could adopt to ameliorate the 
negative externalities affecting client choice that the unfinished business 
doctrine creates. 
Part I explains the difference between how fees generated from 
pending matters are divided among partners when law firms dissolve and 
wind up, as compared to when partners withdraw from law firms. It further 
explores how the unfinished business doctrine may infringe clients’ choice 
of counsel and negatively affect a former partner’s prospects of being 
admitted as a partner at another law firm. Part II discusses the two recent 
cases in the Southern District of New York and analyzes the main 
arguments of each case. Part III argues that the unfinished business 
doctrine applies to hourly matters but that the application of the doctrine in 
New York is not ideal, especially because it creates elevated financial 
disincentives for attorneys who continue to work on hourly client matters. 
Part III next proposes a solution that would reduce the financial 
disincentives of the unfinished business doctrine by allowing partners to 
earn reasonable compensation for winding up unfinished business. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE 
The law of partnerships is a creature of state law.14 Partnership 
agreements may set forth the rights and duties among partners, but when an 
issue or dispute arises that the partnership agreement has not addressed—or 
when no partnership agreement exists—state law fills in the gaps.15 
Although partnership law differs state by state, each state’s partnership law 
is largely based on the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) or the more updated 
 
12 Id. at 745; Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, No. 11 civ. 5994 
(CM), 2012 WL 2952929 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012). 
13 Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. K&L Gates LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), No. 12-4916 (L) (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 
2013) (Bloomberg Law, Dockets, Req. No. 83), certified questions accepted, 2014 WL 113013 (N.Y. 
Jan. 14, 2014); Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.), certified 
questions accepted, 2013 WL 6499301 (N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013). 
14 See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: 
GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 1:1, at 5–6 (2012). 
15 See 1 CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.02(b), at 1:26–
:27 (2013); see also, e.g., Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1984) (applying California’s 
partnership law because the partnership agreement was silent about how attorneys’ fees from unfinished 
business should be allocated among partners). 
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version, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).16 New York’s 
partnership law parallels the UPA. The unfinished business doctrine is a 
judicial gloss on partnership law that arises when a law firm dissolves and 
winds up. 
This Part discusses the unfinished business doctrine and how it 
influences the way partners divide earnings when a law firm partnership 
dissolves and winds up, but not when one or more partners withdraw from 
a partnership. It further explains how the unfinished business doctrine may 
negatively affect clients’ choice of counsel and a former partner’s prospects 
of becoming a partner at another firm. 
A. Partnership Dissolution Versus Partner Withdrawal 
Two ways a partner’s association with a law firm terminates are when 
the firm as a whole dissolves and winds up or when the partner resigns or 
withdraws from the firm. This section describes how partners typically 
divide fees from client matters when a law firm dissolves and winds up as 
compared to when a partner withdraws from the firm. 
1. Partnership Dissolution.—When a law firm partnership dissolves, 
whether by choice or due to bankruptcy, the firm enters the winding-up 
phase.17 Winding up typically involves “completing all of the partnership’s 
uncompleted transactions, . . . reducing all assets to cash, and . . . 
distributing the proceeds, if any, to the partners.”18 During this process, the 
partnership continues to exist until the business of the firm has been wound 
up.19 Further, while partners wind up the partnership, they continue to owe 
fiduciary duties to one another because they are winding up the business 
for the benefit of the partnership.20 
A significant question arises when a law firm partnership dissolves: 
are pending client matters assets of the partnership subject to winding up? 
Thus, if the former partners continue working on the unfinished cases, do 
their fiduciary duties require them to share the earnings with other 
partners? This question arises from vagueness in the UPA, RUPA, and 
many partnership agreements. The UPA and RUPA do not define what 
winding up entails, and law firm partnership agreements often fail to define 
 
16 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) [hereinafter RUPA]; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914) [hereinafter UPA]. The 
partnership law of twelve states is based on the original UPA from 1914, while the partnership law of 
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia is based on the revised version, RUPA. See Partnership 
Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2013). Louisiana is the only state whose partnership law is not based on the UPA or 
RUPA. Id. 
17 See RUPA, supra note 16, §§ 801–802; UPA, supra note 16, §§ 30–31. 
18 WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 227, at 369 (3d ed. 2001). 
19 RUPA, supra note 16, § 802; UPA, supra note 16, § 30. 
20 See GREGORY, supra note 18, § 227, at 369. 
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the parameters of winding up.21 Consequently, if litigation ensues, this 
question is left to the court. 
Courts and treatises generally interpret winding-up activities broadly.22 
Many courts have held that pending client matters are unfinished business 
of the firm—partnership assets that are subject to winding up.23 Jewel v. 
Boxer,24 the influential case on the unfinished business or Jewel doctrine, 
was decided by the California Court of Appeal in 1984 and is often cited 
uncritically and at face value for the proposition that unfinished, pending 
client matters are assets of the firm subject to winding up.25 
Jewel involved a four-partner law firm that dissolved by mutual 
agreement.26 After the firm dissolved, the former partners informed the 
clients they represented that the firm no longer existed.27 Thereafter, the 
clients signed forms that substituted the former law firm with the new firms 
where the attorneys who previously handled their cases had become 
partners.28 Two of the former partners filed suit, seeking to recover what 
they believed was their portion of the profits that the other partners 
generated on pending, unfinished cases.29 The trial court allocated fees 
earned after the dissolution to the partners on a quantum meruit basis, 
which took into account the time the partners spent on the cases before and 
after the firm dissolved, and the plaintiffs appealed.30 Because the law firm 
had no partnership agreement, both the trial and appellate courts relied on 
California’s codification of the UPA.31 
The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s quantum meruit 
allocation of the fees, focusing on the plain language of the UPA.32 The 
court recognized the UPA’s so-called no-compensation rule, which 
prevents a partner from taking additional compensation “for acting in the 
 
21 See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Ct. App. 1984) (“[C]ontrary to the sound legal advice 
they undoubtedly always gave their partnership clients, they had no written partnership agreement.”); 
Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and Lawyer Mobility: 
Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 449, 454 (2011) (“In practice, . . . law firm 
partnership agreements often are ill-conceived, poorly drafted, and hopelessly out of date.”). 
22 See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 18, § 227, at 368 (noting that the winding-up period ends when 
“all the partnership affairs have been wound up”).  
23 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale (In re Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R. 
391, 408–09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing jurisdictions that have adopted the unfinished business 
doctrine). 
24 203 Cal. Rptr. 13. 
25 See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 739 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
26 203 Cal. Rptr. at 15. 
27 Id. at 15–16. 
28 Id. at 16. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 16–17. California has since revised its partnership law to parallel RUPA. See 
Partnership Act, supra note 16. 
32 See Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 16–19. 
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partnership business,” absent an agreement to the contrary.33 It explained 
that because a partnership continues to exist until the partners complete the 
unfinished partnership business, and because the partners are not entitled to 
additional compensation for completing unfinished business, income 
generated from unfinished business—less reasonable overhead expenses 
that do not include partners’ salaries—should be allocated among all of the 
former partners according to each partner’s percentage interest in the firm.34 
This is the unfinished business doctrine, a judicial interpretation of the duty 
to account that partners owe one another while they wind up a partnership. 
The Jewel court rejected a number of arguments. First, it rejected the 
contention that because a client has the absolute right to discharge an 
attorney, the former partners are only entitled to the value of the services 
performed before the client discharged the former law firm.35 The court 
reasoned that the duties partners owe one another are separate from a 
client’s right to discharge an attorney.36 Second, the court rejected the idea 
that the substitution forms that the clients signed transmuted the unfinished 
business into new business.37 Otherwise, a former partner would be 
permitted to breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty and take advantage of 
opportunities belonging to the partnership for personal gain.38 Third, though 
the doctrine could arguably discourage attorneys from continuing to 
represent clients because they would only be entitled to a fraction of the 
income they generated, the court noted that the partners were entitled to the 
same share of income as if the firm had not broken apart.39 The court 
further noted that each attorney would receive a portion of the fees that the 
other former partners were generating from unfinished business.40 It 
explained that because each former partner has a duty to wind up the 
partnership, former partners should not face “undue hardship” in winding 
 
33 UPA, supra note 16, § 18(f). However, a partner is entitled to additional compensation for 
winding up the partnership after another partner’s death. Id. The no-compensation rule is where the 
UPA and RUPA diverge with respect to the unfinished business doctrine. Under RUPA, a partner is 
entitled to “reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the business of the 
partnership.” RUPA, supra note 16, § 401(h). Thus, under RUPA, a partner who completes unfinished 
business after a partnership dissolves is entitled to additional compensation, while a partner who 
completes unfinished business under the UPA is not. See Mark I. Weinstein, The Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act: An Analysis of Its Impact on the Relationship of Law Firm Dissolution, Contingent 
Fee Cases and the No Compensation Rule, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 857, 871–72 (1995). 
34 Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 19. 
35 See id. at 17–18. 
36 See id. at 17 (“[T]he right of a client to the attorney of one’s choice and the rights and duties as 
between partners with respect to income from unfinished business are distinct and do not offend one 
another. Once the client’s fee is paid to an attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is 
allocated among the attorney and his or her former partners.”). 
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up the unfinished business.41 Moreover, to the extent that there is undue 
hardship, the court reasoned that it exists because the former partners failed 
to enter into an agreement that specified the allocation of earnings from 
unfinished business.42 
The court also acknowledged policy reasons for the unfinished 
business doctrine, appearing concerned about the relationship among 
partners. It reasoned that without the doctrine, partners would compete for 
the most profitable cases, thinking that they would be able to keep fees 
from those cases should the partnership dissolve.43 It might also diminish 
the likelihood that former partners will steal client files so that they can 
continue working on existing matters for personal gain after the firm 
dissolves.44 Ultimately, the unfinished business doctrine arises out of the 
duties partners owe one another when a partnership winds up. The doctrine 
recognizes pending cases as assets of the partnership subject to winding up. 
2. Partner Withdrawal.—In practice, the unfinished business 
doctrine that Jewel established does not apply when one or more partners 
withdraw from a law firm; it is usually only invoked when a law firm 
dissolves and subsequently winds up.45 Technically, when a partner 
withdraws from a law firm, in New York and under the UPA, the 
partnership automatically dissolves and enters the winding-up phase.46 
However, when the withdrawing partner agrees, the remaining partners 
may buy out the departing partner’s interest in the firm and continue the 
partnership.47 This avoids the need for the partnership to wind up and 
liquidate assets, collect accounts receivable, and distribute proceeds to the 
partners.48 
The unfinished business doctrine does not apply when a partner 
withdraws because the payment to the departing partner, in theory, 
constitutes winding up.49 Thus, dissolution and winding up occur “only in 
 
41 Id. 
42 See id. at 19. 
43 Id. at 18. Arguably, it may be questionable whether competition for client matters among 
partners is always bad policy from the standpoint of a client. But see Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 
413, 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (explaining how “case-chasing by attorneys” places clients “in the middle 
of a dispute among the partners over money”). 
44 Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18. 
45 Douglas R. Richmond, Migratory Law Partners and the Glue of Unfinished Business, 39 N. KY. 
L. REV. 359, 370 (2012) (“[C]ourts tend to apply the unfinished business doctrine only when a law firm 
dissolves and ultimately terminates its affairs . . . .”). 
46 See N.Y. P’SHIP LAW §§ 60–61, 62(1)(b) (McKinney 2006); UPA, supra note 16, §§ 29–30, 
31(1)(b). 
47 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 
§ 7.11(a), at 7:154.7–.8 (2013). 
48 See id. 
49 See id. § 7.01(b), at 7:14. 
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the technical sense.”50 Once a partner’s interest has been settled, the partner 
no longer owes fiduciary duties to the other partners.51 The withdrawing 
partner may then solicit former clients and continue to work on cases that 
were pending when the partner withdrew, without having to share fees.52 
Therefore, in practice, partners only have a duty to share fees from pending 
client matters when a law firm dissolves and winds up. 
B. How the Unfinished Business Doctrine Affects Client Choice 
While the unfinished business doctrine may attempt to ensure the fair 
distribution of earnings from partnership business when partnerships wind 
up, the doctrine also creates negative externalities. In states with 
partnership law statutes that parallel the UPA, such as New York, the 
doctrine may impede a client’s choice of counsel. It may impose economic 
disincentives on a partner and the new firm that the partner joins for 
working on the client’s unfinished matter, thereby inducing the partner to 
withdraw from the case. The economic disincentives arise because the UPA 
requires former partners to share earnings on client matters without the 
right to additional compensation.53 
As an illustration, assume that a law firm of five partners dissolves and 
that each of those partners is entitled to 20% of the firm’s profits. Under the 
Jewel doctrine, if one of those five partners joins a new law firm as a 
partner—and the new firm continues working on unfinished business of the 
former firm—the new firm would only be entitled to the former partner’s 
20% stake; each of the four other former partners are entitled to their 20% 
share. Further, the partner who joined the new firm is only entitled to a 
fraction of the 20% to which the new firm is entitled. If the partner also has 
a 20% stake in the new firm, the partner is now only entitled to 4% of 
earnings from unfinished business. Thus, the partner’s interest in the matter 
declined from 20% to 4%, while the other partners at the new firm may 
only retain the remaining 16% of earnings that the firm bills.54 The 
remaining four partners of the dissolved firm, who contribute nothing, 




51 See id. § 7.01(b), at 7:9–:13. 
52 See Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118, 119–21 (Ind. 1993) (declining to apply the unfinished 
business doctrine after a partner withdrew from a law firm and continued working on a pending matter 
of his former firm). 
53 See generally Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 6, at 1597–619. The economic disincentives would 
not be as great in states that have adopted RUPA because RUPA eliminated the no-compensation rule 
that exists in the UPA. See supra note 33. Under RUPA, partners are entitled to additional 
compensation for completing unfinished business. See supra note 33. 
54 The economic disincentives illustrated in this example would not exist for a partnership with an 
“eat-what-you-kill” profit structure, where partners are entitled to the earnings from their own client 
matters. 
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This dilution of earnings creates an opportunity cost that may make 
lawyers and the new firms that they join unwilling to continue representing 
clients with unfinished business. Professor Hillman acknowledged that the 
Jewel doctrine “may produce situations in which partners attempt to shed 
cases requiring substantial additional work but little in the way of economic 
incentives” because partners complete unfinished business without earning 
additional compensation.55 Two commentators have referred to this 
economic disincentive as locking out a client from having a matter handled 
by the attorney of the client’s choice.56 The problem becomes magnified 
when a former firm’s unfinished business is comprised of matters that take 
years to resolve because the doctrine requires partners to share fees until 
the matters are completed.57 Therefore, if a lawsuit continues for ten years, 
the partners continue to owe fiduciary duties to one another—albeit only 
with respect to the unfinished business—and must share the fees from the 
suit with each other during this ten-year period.58 
Although ethics rules impose some limitations on when attorneys may 
withdraw from representing clients, in practice, the rules may not prevent 
attorneys from withdrawing from pending cases after a law firm dissolves. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to withdraw 
from representing a client if “withdrawal can be accomplished without 
material adverse effect on the interests of the client,” or for one of several 
other reasons.59 The Model Rules explicitly allow an attorney to resign if 
continued representation would cause the attorney to face an “unreasonable 
financial burden,” even if withdrawal would be materially adverse to the 
client.60 The unfinished business doctrine might create such a burden 
depending on an attorney’s financial situation. Further, the Model Rules 
 
55 ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER 
WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.8.1, at 2:166 (2d ed. 2013). 
56 See Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 6, at 1599–600. But see Richmond, supra note 45, at 418 
(arguing that there is no evidence that the lock-out problem exists). 
57 See Hillman, supra note 21, at 465 (“Winding up a law firm may be a protracted process that 
extends for several years, particularly when the business being wound up includes complex litigation or 
contingent fee cases.”); see also Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 44–45 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(illustrating how a pending case may lengthen the winding-up period of a law firm). Some courts have 
specified that matters that are later appealed after a law firm dissolves constitute new business not 
subject to the unfinished business doctrine. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer 
& Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Talley v. Lamb, 100 N.Y.S.2d 112, 117–18 
(Sup. Ct. 1950)); Platt v. Henderson, 361 P.2d 73, 86 (Or. 1961). 
58 See HILLMAN, supra note 55, § 4.6.3, at 4:70-8. During the winding-up phase, partners may 
compete with their former partners and seek opportunities for themselves to serve clients on new 
matters. See In re Silverberg, 438 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (App. Div. 1981) (citing Talley, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 
118). 
59 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (2013). 
60 Id. r. 1.16(b)(6); see also Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 630 A.2d 820, 831–32 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (holding that an attorney may withdraw from representation if a case poses 
an unreasonable financial burden, even if the client would suffer material adverse effects). 
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allow an attorney to withdraw for “good cause,” even if withdrawal would 
be materially adverse to the client.61 A lawyer might explain to a judge, for 
instance, that joining a new firm would interfere with the lawyer’s ability to 
best represent the client when, in fact, the lawyer is merely concerned that 
the case is no longer profitable.62 Therefore, in practice, the ethics rules 
may not protect clients or guard against the financial-disincentive 
externality that the unfinished business doctrine creates. 
The unfinished business doctrine may also negatively impact a former 
partner’s prospects of becoming a partner at another law firm. The reason 
for this is that the doctrine may impose liability on a new firm that 
completes unfinished business that a former partner brings.63 Oftentimes, 
the value of a newly admitted partner to a law firm is based on the partner’s 
existing client relationships. If a law firm would be required to disgorge 
earnings to a dissolved law firm, the value that a prospective partner brings 
to the new firm is diminished. The new firm may be unwilling to assume 
this liability and decide not to take on a prospective new partner for this 
reason. 
The consequences are real and substantial for law firms that take on 
lateral partners who bring unfinished business. In 2010, Baker & McKenzie 
LLP agreed to a $6.65 million settlement to compensate the bankruptcy 
estate of Coudert Brothers LLP for the profits Baker earned on unfinished 
business.64 This was in addition to nearly $17 million of contingency fees 
from unfinished business that Baker agreed to forfeit.65 In 2011, Covington 
& Burling LLP paid a $4 million settlement to the bankruptcy estate of 
 
61 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(7). 
62 But see Vollgraff v. Block, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 440 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (concluding that “mere 
dissolution of the defendants’ law partnership was ineffective to terminate the partners’ obligations as 
attorneys toward partnership clients”). 
63 See Joan C. Rogers, Law Firm’s Organizational Form, Insolvency Affect Extent of Members’ 
Personal Liability, 28 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 163, 165 (2012). One court relied on 
the state’s codification of Section 13 of the UPA, which imposes liability on a partnership for a 
partner’s wrongful acts in the ordinary course of business. See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, No. 11 civ. 5994 (CM), 2012 WL 2952929, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 
2012). The court held that the partners’ breach of fiduciary duties to their dissolved law firm—bringing 
unfinished business to new firms—constituted a wrongful act for which the new firms were liable. See 
id. Another court held that a firm taking on a partner of a dissolved law firm could be held liable under 
an interference-with-contract cause of action. See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 
180, 192–94 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi 
Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1994). A new firm may have to disgorge earnings from unfinished 
business if the dissolved firm modified its partnership agreement to waive the application of the 
unfinished business doctrine on the eve of bankruptcy. See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 
LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 338–48 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding 
that such a waiver could constitute a fraudulent transfer made while the law firm was insolvent). 
64 Joyce E. Cutler, Jewel Under Scrutiny in Bankruptcy Court as Fights over Unfinished Business 
Continue, 29 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 22, 23 (2013). 
65 Id. 
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Heller Ehrman LLP.66 More recently, Baker & Hostetler LLP agreed to pay 
$41 million to the bankruptcy estate of Howrey LLP to settle claims 
involving matters that eleven former Howrey partners brought to the firm.67 
Additionally, Paul Hastings LLP and two former Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP 
partners who now practice at Paul Hastings agreed to pay close to $1.6 
million to settle unfinished business claims with the bankruptcy estate of 
Dewey.68 Over the next few years, certain former partners of Dewey and 
the firms they join may be subject to unfinished business suits for tens of 
millions of dollars.69 This potential liability that a new firm may take on 
might negatively affect a former partner’s prospects of becoming a partner 
at a new firm. And if a partner is unable to become a partner at a new firm, 
the corollary effect is that a client’s choice of counsel may be infringed if 
the partner does not have the wherewithal to handle the case alone. 
In short, the unfinished business doctrine applies to pending cases 
when a law firm dissolves and winds up if the partnership agreement does 
not waive the doctrine. The unfinished business doctrine may impose 
externalities that affect a client’s choice of counsel because the doctrine 
may create economic disincentives for a partner and the partner’s new firm 
that continue working on unfinished business. Moreover, the doctrine may 
make it more difficult for a former partner to join a new law firm. One 
significant question remains: does it matter whether unfinished business is 
billed on contingency or by the hour? The next two Parts consider this very 
issue. 
II. THE SPLIT WITHIN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
Despite the fact that New York City is the largest legal market,70 the 
state’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, has yet to address 
whether or how the unfinished business doctrine applies to law firms. 
During 2012, in separate cases, two district judges in the Southern District 
of New York considered the issue of whether the doctrine applies to 
 
66 Id. 
67 Jacqueline Palank, Trustee Strikes Key Deals in Winding Down Howrey, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 
2013, at B4. 
68 Martha Neil, Paul Hastings, 2 Partners to Pay $1.6M to Settle Dewey Unfinished Business 
Claim, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/paul_hastings_2_
partners_to_pay_1.6m_to_settle_dewey_unfinished_business_cl. 
69 See supra note 1 (explaining that Dewey’s partnership agreement did not waive the application 
of the unfinished business doctrine, that the bankruptcy settlements with some of Dewey’s largest 
earners did not resolve claims for unfinished business, and that Dewey’s unfinished business was 
valued at $60 million). 
70 See Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-
Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2011). 
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matters law firms bill by the hour.71 This Part discusses and analyzes each 
case. 
The first judge to address the issue held that the unfinished business 
doctrine applies to hourly matters,72 while the second judge held that it does 
not.73 Both judges certified their decisions for interlocutory appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.74 The Second Circuit granted both 
interlocutory appeals and certified questions to the New York Court of 
Appeals, which the court has accepted but not yet answered.75 
The New York Court of Appeals will likely reexamine Cohen v. Lord, 
Day & Lord,76 one of its decisions that courts in many jurisdictions have 
cited.77 In Cohen, the court held that a provision in a partnership agreement 
that restricted an attorney’s ability to practice law and a client’s choice of 
legal counsel was unenforceable.78 The Court of Appeals will be faced with 
the issue of reconciling the state’s prohibition of certain restrictive 
covenants in law firm partnership agreements with the unfinished business 
doctrine because the doctrine creates effects similar to restrictions on the 
practice of law. 
A. Development Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &  
Feld LLP 
In May 2012, Judge McMahon of the Southern District of New York 
held that the unfinished business doctrine applies to client matters that law 
firms bill by the hour because unfinished matters are partnership assets for 
which partners owe a duty to account.79 The plaintiff, Development 
Specialists, Inc. (DSI), was the administrator of the bankruptcy estate of 
 
71 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 738–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 331–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
72 See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344, 349. 
73 See Geron, 476 B.R. at 743. 
74 Id. at 745; Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, No. 11 civ. 5994 
(CM), 2012 WL 2952929 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012). 
75 Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. K&L Gates LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), No. 12-4916 (L) (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 
2013) (Bloomberg Law, Dockets, Req. No. 83), certified questions accepted, 2014 WL 113013 (N.Y. 
Jan. 14, 2014); Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.), certified 
questions accepted, 2013 WL 6499301 (N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013). 
76 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989). 
77 E.g., Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So. 2d 765, 770 (Ala. 1996); 
Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 727, 732 (Ariz. 2006); Howard v. 
Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158, 163 (Cal. 1993); Neuman v. Akman, 715 A.2d 127, 131–37 (D.C. 1998); 
Donnelly v. Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville, Schoenebaum, & Walker, P.L.C., 599 N.W.2d 
677, 680, 682 (Iowa 1999); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287, 1292 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1991), rev’d, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992). 
78 See 550 N.E.2d at 411. 
79 See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 326, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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Coudert Brothers LLP, a law firm that dissolved in 2005.80 DSI sued ten 
law firms that former Coudert partners joined in an attempt to recover 
profits that the firms earned on Coudert’s pending, uncompleted client 
matters.81 The issue before the court was whether the hourly client matters 
were in fact partnership property subject to winding up.82 Judge McMahon 
analyzed how the state’s highest court would address the issue and set forth 
numerous arguments that I have categorized into four points below. 
1. Cases Are Partnership Property, and Partnership Property 
Belongs to the Partnership, Not to the Individual Partners.—The 
DSI court examined the fundamental concept of a partnership. The court 
found that because a partnership is comprised of a group of co-owners who 
carry on a business, it would be contrary to partnership law to find that the 
firm’s pending cases belong to individual partners.83 It reasoned that the 
billing arrangement between a client and the firm should have no bearing 
on whether cases are assets.84 The court recognized that only unfinished 
business—not new business from a client that partners take on after the 
partnership dissolves—is an asset of the partnership.85 New business cannot 
be an asset since a law firm only has an expectation of obtaining new 
business.86 As such, an attorney who collects fees associated with new 
business has no duty to share the earnings with former partners. 
The court rejected the argument that because a client has the right to 
terminate a relationship with an attorney at will, Coudert’s pending cases 
are not partnership assets.87 It explained how executory contracts can be 
partnership assets, citing Stem v. Warren,88 where the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a contract for architectural services was a partnership 
asset even though the contract was terminable at will.89 
2. Other UPA Jurisdictions Treat Hourly Matters as Assets of the 
Partnership.—The court cited a handful of cases that have 
cursorily considered whether hourly pending cases are assets of the 
 
80 Id. at 322–23. 
81 Id. at 322. 
82 See id. at 326. 
83 See id. at 331–32 (“A law partnership not only possesses fixed assets in the form of typewriters, 
bookcases, etc., it possesses assets in the form of cases and legal matters.” (quoting In re Lester, 403 
N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (App. Div. 1978))). 
84 Id. at 332. 
85 See id. 
86 Id. However, arguably, a law firm never has more than an expectation of obtaining future 
business associated with unfinished business since clients can discharge their attorneys at will. 
87 See id. at 333. 
88 125 N.E. 811 (N.Y. 1920). 
89 See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 333–34. 
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partnership and concluded that they are.90 The court emphasized that New 
York law instructs courts to harmonize their rulings with other 
jurisdictions’ interpretations of the UPA.91 
3. The Differences Between Contingent Fee and Hourly Billable 
Arrangements Are Not Meaningful.—The law firm defendants 
argued that Coudert’s interest—and therefore the bankruptcy trustee’s 
interest—in hourly matters is limited to the number of hours Coudert 
performed before it dissolved, multiplied by the applicable hourly rate.92 
However, the DSI court found that the only difference between contingent 
fee and hourly matters is “when and how” a client compensates a law 
firm.93 The court rejected the contention that hourly billing gives rise to a 
series of “mini-contracts” where unfinished business “becomes ‘finished 
business’ with the submission of each periodic invoice.”94 More 
specifically, the court stated that hourly billable work is not like a month-
to-month lease because lawyers enter into agreements to provide legal 
counsel generally or for specific matters.95 And even though a law firm is 
entitled to recover the quantum meruit value of the work it has performed 
on contingency when a client discharges the firm, this principle operates 
separately from the fiduciary duties partners owe one another during 
dissolution.96 
Further, the court distinguished the rights that law firms have against 
clients and the rights that partners have against one another. A law firm has 
a right against its clients to be paid for the work it has performed.97 Partners 
have a duty to account to former partners all earnings from partnership 
assets that existed on the date of dissolution.98 Unless otherwise agreed 
upon, all partners are entitled to a share of those earnings based on an 
allocation set forth in the partnership agreement.99 The argument that 
unfinished contingent fee matters are partnership assets, whereas 
unfinished hourly matters are not because of differences in payment 
 
90 See id. at 336–37 (citing Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–6 (D.D.C. 1997); 
Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 
318, 333 n.20 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale (In re 
Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R. 391, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
571, 572–73 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
91 Id. at 336 (citing N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 4(4) (McKinney 2006) (“This chapter shall be so 
interpreted and construed as to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it.”)). 
92 See id. at 337. 
93 Id. at 339. 
94 Id. at 337–38. 
95 Id. at 339. 
96 See id. at 338. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 335–36. 
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structure, “conflates a law firm’s rights against its clients . . . and the rights 
of former partners among themselves.”100 In other words, the compensation 
structure of a client matter has no bearing on the relationship and duties 
among partners.101 
4. New York’s Public Policy Does Not Require Hourly Matters to Be 
Treated Differently than Contingent Fee Matters.—The DSI court 
observed that the law firm defendants’ strongest argument was that the 
unfinished business doctrine would create a financial disincentive for an 
attorney to continue representing a client on an existing, unfinished 
matter.102 Under New York law (and in most states that have addressed the 
issue), provisions in partnership agreements are unenforceable if they 
create financial disincentives for attorneys to continue representing 
clients.103 The genesis of this prohibition in New York is Rule 5.6(a)(1) of 
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that “[a] lawyer 
shall not participate in offering or making . . . a partnership . . . agreement 
that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the 
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement.”104 
The DSI court noted that the New York Court of Appeals, in relying 
on the state’s ethics rules, has declined to enforce restrictive provisions in 
law firm partnership agreements in two cases where the provisions had 
effects similar to the application of the unfinished business doctrine.105 In 
Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, the partnership agreement at issue required a 
partner who voluntarily withdrew to forfeit his interest in accounts 
receivable if he competed with the firm.106 The Cohen court acknowledged 
that even though the provision did not prohibit a partner from practicing 
law, the monetary penalty restricted the practice of law because it would 
discourage a withdrawing partner from continuing to represent clients.107 
The court noted that the purpose of the ethics rule that proscribes restrictive 
partnership agreements is to ensure choice of counsel.108 
Similarly, in Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, the Court 
of Appeals refused to enforce a provision in a law firm partnership 
agreement that required a former partner to either return a portion of profits 
he had previously been allocated or pay a portion of fees that his new firm 
 
100 Id. at 338. 
101 See id. at 339. 
102 Id. at 340. 
103 See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989); Robert W. Hillman, Client 
Choice, Contractual Restraints, and the Market for Legal Services, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 73 (2007). 
104 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(a)(1) (2012); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.6(a) (2013). 
105 See 477 B.R. at 340–43. 
106 550 N.E.2d at 410–11. 
107 Id. at 411. 
108 Id. 
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would bill clients of the old firm.109 The New York Court of Appeals 
reiterated similar reasoning that it set forth in Cohen—that financial 
disincentives interfere with a client’s choice of counsel.110 The DSI court 
stated that Denburg was the case that best supported the law firm 
defendants because the financial disincentive in the partnership agreement 
had the same effect as the unfinished business doctrine and no-
compensation rule.111 
However, the DSI court found that the holdings of Cohen and Denburg 
were not directly applicable to the case at hand for three reasons. First, both 
cases dealt with partnership withdrawal, not partnership dissolution.112 
When a partnership is not dissolving, the default UPA rules about winding 
up do not take effect.113 In the case of DSI, however, the firm was winding 
up, and while a firm is winding up, partners have a duty to wind up the 
partnership for the benefit of the partners.114 
Second, the unfinished business doctrine did not pertain to Cohen and 
Denburg.115 Cohen involved a partner forfeiting compensation if he 
competed with the firm he left, while Denburg involved a clause that 
required the withdrawing partner to share the earnings related to new 
business (as opposed to unfinished business) from former clients.116 
Third, the DSI court concluded that the financial disincentives are the 
same, whether unfinished business is billed by the hour or on contingency, 
because the amount earned must be shared with the partners of the 
dissolved firm.117 Although the New York Court of Appeals has never 
addressed the issue of the unfinished business doctrine, the opinions of the 
Appellate Division indicate that contingent fee cases are assets of a 
dissolved law firm; no opinion has held that the financial-disincentive 
rationale of Cohen and Denburg is reason not to apply the doctrine.118 Thus, 
the court reasoned that applying the unfinished business doctrine to 
pending hourly matters does not violate public policy.119 
In short, the DSI court held that the unfinished business doctrine 
applies to matters billed by the hour. Of particular significance is the 
 
109 624 N.E.2d 995, 997 (N.Y. 1993). 
110 See id. at 998–99. 
111 See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 342–43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
112 Id. at 343. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 323, 327. 
115 Id. at 343. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 343–44. But see infra Part III.B (discussing how financial disincentives are greater when 
the unfinished business doctrine is applied to hourly matters, as compared to matters billed on 
contingency). 
118 See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344. 
119 See id. at 344, 349. 
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court’s narrow reading of the ethics rule that proscribes restrictive 
agreements in law firm partnership agreements and its interpretation of 
Cohen and Denburg. In the next case discussed below, the judge 
interpreted the ethics rule and Cohen more liberally. 
B. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP 
In September 2012, Judge Pauley120 of the Southern District of New 
York held that hourly billable client matters pending on the date of a law 
firm’s dissolution are not assets of the partnership.121 Geron is particularly 
interesting because it is the first opinion to thoroughly analyze the 
application of the unfinished business doctrine to hourly matters and then 
conclude that the doctrine does not apply to hourly matters.122 The plaintiff 
in the case was the bankruptcy trustee of Thelen LLP, a failed law firm.123 
The trustee sued Seyfarth Shaw LLP and Robinson & Cole LLP, two law 
firms that hired former Thelen partners and billed clients for pending but 
unfinished hourly work that Thelen began.124 In October 2008, when the 
firm was insolvent, the partners voted to dissolve Thelen and incorporate a 
so-called Jewel waiver into their partnership agreement that waived the 
application of the unfinished business doctrine.125 Thelen filed for 
bankruptcy in September 2009.126 The trustee’s main contention was that 
adding the Jewel waiver constituted a fraudulent transfer.127 Consequently, 
the trustee sought to recover the value of the unfinished business that was 
“transferred” to the two law firm defendants. 
The Geron court examined some of the same issues that the DSI court 
considered, ultimately giving greater deference to Cohen—where the New 
York Court of Appeals held that a provision in a partnership agreement that 
restricted the practice of law was unenforceable—and less deference to 
Stem—where the Court of Appeals suggested that terminable-at-will 
 
120 I interned for Judge Pauley during the summer of 2012. At no point was I involved with Geron, 
and I have never discussed the case or this Note with Judge Pauley. 
121 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
122 Cf. id. at 739 n.2 (“Over the last three decades, courts have cited Jewel reflexively and 
uncritically. Thus, from modest beginnings in a dispute involving a small Alameda County general 
practice firm, the Jewel doctrine has grown to ensnare some of the largest law firms in the United 
States.”). 
123 Id. at 736. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. (The Jewel waiver stated: “Neither the Partners nor the Partnership shall have any claim or 
entitlement to clients, cases or matters ongoing at the time of dissolution of the Partnership other than 
the entitlement for collection of amounts due for work performed by the Partners and other Partnership 
personnel prior to their departure from the Partnership. [This provision is] intended to expressly waive, 
opt out of and be in lieu of any rights any Partner or the Partnership may have to ‘unfinished business’ 
of the Partnership, as the term is defined in Jewel v. Boxer, . . . or as otherwise might be provided in the 
absence of this provision through the interpretation or application of” partnership law.). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 736–37. 
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executory contracts are partnership assets. I have categorized the court’s 
main arguments into five points below and critiqued its reasoning in a few 
instances. 
1. Recognizing a Property Interest in Unfinished Hourly Matters 
Violates New York’s Public Policy.—The court noted that New 
York has a “strong public policy in favor of client autonomy and attorney 
mobility.”128 Reducing the compensation a former partner is entitled to 
when that former partner, or that former partner’s new firm, completes all 
of the work would provide an “unjust windfall” to the bankruptcy estate.129 
The court found that such an unjust windfall is the equivalent of a 
restriction on the practice of law that violates public policy, which Cohen 
proscribes.130 More specifically, the court noted that the unfinished business 
doctrine as applied to hourly matters “clash[es]” with New York’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct because Rule 1.5(g) restricts a lawyer’s ability to 
share fees with a lawyer who is not part of the same firm.131 The court 
acknowledged that even though professional ethics rules are not the law, 
“New York courts interpret other laws to harmonize with them where 
possible.”132 However, the court overlooked the comments to the ethics 
rule, which state that the rule “does not prohibit or regulate division of fees 
to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously 
associated in a law firm.”133 Ultimately, the Geron court interpreted Cohen 
more liberally than did the DSI court, finding that Cohen’s proscription 
against restrictive covenants in agreements among attorneys is 
incompatible with the unfinished business doctrine.134 The DSI court, on the 
other hand, construed Cohen as not restricting the application of the 
unfinished business doctrine.135 
2. Recognizing a Property Interest in Unfinished Hourly Matters 
Contravenes New York’s Application of the Unfinished Business 
Doctrine to Contingent Fee Matters.—The court stated that New 
York case law does not necessarily prescribe that 100% of earnings from 
unfinished contingent fee matters are partnership assets. The court referred 
 
128 Id. at 742–43. 
129 Id. at 740. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(g) cmt. 8 (2012); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 8 (2013). Some courts have held that fee sharing among former law firm partners 
who later work in different firms is not a violation of ethics rules because the old partnership continues 
to exist until the partnership is fully wound up. E.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale 
(In re Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R. 391, 414 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 
N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
134 The Geron court did not discuss the significance of Denburg to the holding in Cohen. 
135 See supra Part II.A.4. 
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to Santalucia v. Sebright Transportation, Inc.,136 Shandell v. Katz,137 and 
Kirsch v. Leventhal,138 which held that unfinished contingent fee matters 
should be valued on the date a partnership dissolves and that any 
postdissolution fees earned due to a lawyer’s “post-dissolution efforts, skill 
and diligence” need not be shared with former partners.139 The Geron court 
applied this logic and reasoned that because postdissolution fees earned on 
hourly matters arise from a lawyer’s “post-dissolution efforts, skill and 
diligence,” pending hourly cases are not partnership assets subject to the 
unfinished business doctrine.140 
However, the holdings in Santalucia, Shandell, and Kirsch are the 
product of the Second Circuit and Appellate Division misapplying 
partnership law.141 Each case involved the dissolution and winding up of a 
law firm.142 The three opinions relied on the section of New York 
partnership law that parallels Section 42 of the UPA, entitling a 
withdrawing partner or estate of a deceased partner to the value of their 
partnership interests if the partnership continues to operate without winding 
up.143 The three cases sought to apply this principle to the context of 
dissolution and winding up by valuing pending contingent fee cases on the 
date the law firm dissolved. This was incorrect. Section 42 is inapplicable 
when a partnership dissolves and winds up; it only applies when a 
partnership continues to operate after a partner withdraws or dies.144 
Specifically, the purpose of Section 42 is to compensate an outgoing 
partner for the partnership’s continued use of the outgoing partner’s 
 
136 232 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000). 
137 629 N.Y.S.2d 437 (App. Div. 1995). 
138 586 N.Y.S.2d 330 (App. Div. 1992). 
139 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 740–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Santalucia, 
232 F.3d at 298; Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 439; Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 333). 
140 Id. at 741 (quoting Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 439). 
141 See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 347–49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (expressing doubt that the New York Court of Appeals would follow Santalucia, 
Shandell, and Kirsch because the principle they establish “eviscerates” the no-compensation rule). 
142 See Santalucia, 232 F.3d at 295; Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 438; Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 331. 
143 See Santalucia, 232 F.3d at 298–99 (relying on N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 73 (McKinney 2006)); 
Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (same); Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 332–33 (same); UPA, supra note 16, 
§ 42. Section 42 of the UPA also entitles the outgoing partner to opt for either interest on or profits from 
the partnership’s continued use of the partner’s right in the partnership property. However, Section 42 
does not entitle an outgoing partner to profits from unfinished business. See Cadwalader, Wickersham 
& Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that fees “attributable to the 
postdissolution efforts, skill, and diligence of the remaining partners . . . should not be proportionately 
attributable to the use of the departing partner’s right in the property of the dissolved partnership”); 
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 47, § 7.13(f), at 7:210, :212 (An outgoing partner is not entitled to a 
full profit share “because that share was predicated in part on the [outgoing partner’s] contribution of 
services . . . . When profits have been elected [under Section 42], the [outgoing partner] must prove . . . 
what profits were attributable to the use of partnership assets as distinguished from the services of the 
partners.”). 
144 See GREGORY, supra note 18, § 228, at 373; HILLMAN, supra note 55, § 4.3.6.2, at 4:39. 
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capital145—in other words, to prevent an outgoing partner’s capital from 
remaining “trapped” in the partnership.146 Therefore, the three opinions 
were wrong to rely on New York’s codification of Section 42, and the 
principle that Section 42 embraces was likewise of no relevance to Geron. 
3. Recognizing a Property Interest in Hourly Client Matters Would 
Result in Bizarre Consequences.—If unfinished hourly matters are 
partnership property, then they become property of the bankruptcy estate. 
The court indicated that such a holding is nonsensical because “[i]t would 
appear . . . that the Bankruptcy Code empowers a debtor law firm to sell its 
pending hourly fee matters to the highest bidder”147 given that the Code 
authorizes a trustee to “use, sell, or lease” property of the estate.148 This 
directly conflicts with a client’s right to choose legal counsel.149 Moreover, 
the court acknowledged that recognizing hourly matters as assets of a law 
firm might suggest that “a client who discharges a debtor law firm and 
transfers his case to a new firm violates the automatic stay”150 under the 
Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits “act[s] to obtain possession . . . or to 
exercise control over property of the estate.”151 However, the Geron court’s 
reasoning here overlooks the reality that it is only the right to earnings 
associated with unfinished business that is property of the estate; the actual 
cases themselves are not.152 When a client discharges a law firm, that law 
firm has a right to compensation for work performed.153 It is this right to 
compensation that would become property of the estate.154 
4. Law Firm Partnerships Are Different from Other Types of 
Partnerships.—The court explained that it is “overbroad” to 
interpret Stem, like the DSI court did, as standing for the rule that 
terminable-at-will executory contracts are partnership property.155 In Stem, 
the contract between the architecture partnership and the client included a 
clause that contemplated that the contract would be performed 
 
145 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 47, § 7.13(f), at 7:214. 
146 HILLMAN, supra note 55, § 4.3.6.2, at 4:39. 
147 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
148 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006)). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012). 
152 See LaFond v. Sweeney, No. 10CA2005, 2012 WL 503655, at *10 (Colo. App. Feb. 16, 2012) 
(“[W]e distinguish between a pending contingent fee case as unfinished business to be completed in 
winding up a firm, and the fee generated by that case as property of the firm.”). 
153 After a client discharges an attorney who billed on contingency, the discharged attorney can 
generally recover a fee in quantum meruit. JACOB A. STEIN & ANDREW M. BEATO, THE LAW OF LAW 
FIRMS § 8:3, at 250–51 (2012). 
154 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (stating that a bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”). 
155 Geron, 476 B.R. at 741. 
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notwithstanding the death of the partner.156 Unlike a contract for 
architectural services, the Geron court reasoned that a contract for legal 
representation cannot contemplate survival because a client has a right to 
discharge an attorney at will.157 And though the contract in Stem was 
terminable at will, the Geron court emphasized that contracts for legal 
services are “categorically different”158 from other at-will contracts: clients 
place the “ultimate trust and confidence” in their legal counsel, and an 
“attorney’s obligations . . . transcend those prevailing in the commercial 
market place.”159 Applying Stem to contracts for hourly legal fees would 
“undermine” the “unique” attorney–client relationship.160 
5. New York Need Not Follow Other UPA Jurisdictions.—Finally, 
unlike the DSI court, the Geron court rejected the contention that New 
York should follow the approach of other states that embrace the UPA, 
even though New York partnership law instructs courts to harmonize 
rulings on partnership law with other UPA jurisdictions.161 The court 
reasoned that the UPA “harmonize[s] partners’ duties regarding partnership 
property” but that state common law determines what constitutes 
partnership property.162 Thus, the Geron court held that the hourly billable 
matters pending on the date a partnership dissolves do not fall within the 
ambit of the unfinished business doctrine.163 In other words, unfinished 
cases billed by the hour are not partnership assets subject to winding up. 
Both DSI and Geron highlight how the unfinished business doctrine 
may conflict with the profession’s Rules of Professional Conduct and New 
York’s public policy. In DSI, the court gave greater deference to the state’s 
codification of the UPA and placed a higher priority on the duties partners 
owe one another. In Geron, the court placed a higher priority on the 
attorney–client relationship. The New York Court of Appeals will soon 
wrestle with the same issues and make a decision about whether the 
unfinished business doctrine, as applied to hourly matters, contravenes or 
comports with public policy. 
 
156 Stem v. Warren, 125 N.E. 811, 812 (N.Y. 1920). 
157 476 B.R. at 741–42 (citing Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 
(N.Y. 1981) (holding that “a client may discharge an attorney without cause at any time”)). 
158 Id. at 742. 
159 Id. (quoting In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994)). 
160 Id. (citing Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) (“Clients are not 
merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. . . . An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to 
be inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional status.”)). 
161 See id. at 742–43; supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
162 Geron, 476 B.R. at 742. 
163 See id. at 743. 
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III. APPLYING THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE TO 
HOURLY MATTERS 
Two points of contention between DSI and Geron involve whether 
public policy precludes the unfinished business doctrine from applying to 
hourly matters and whether there are meaningful differences between 
hourly billable and contingent fee matters. This Part argues that the 
unfinished business doctrine does not contravene public policy and, 
therefore, applies to both matters billed by the hour and on contingency. 
However, there is a meaningful difference between hourly and contingent 
fee matters that may cause former partners to face higher financial 
disincentives when completing hourly billable unfinished business. This 
Part concludes by suggesting statutory reform to ameliorate the negative 
externalities of the doctrine that implicate client choice and a former 
partner’s prospects of joining a new firm.164 
A. Why the Unfinished Business Doctrine Applies to Hourly Matters 
The unfinished business doctrine may infringe clients’ choice of 
counsel because of the financial disincentives the doctrine imposes in 
certain instances. The effect of the doctrine may have the same impact as 
restrictive covenants in partnership agreements that many states prohibit, 
such as agreements to forfeit compensation. The impact is troubling 
because when it induces a partner to withdraw from a client matter, the 
doctrine causes harm to an existing attorney–client relationship, possibly 
forcing the client to find a new attorney.165 The New York Court of Appeals 
has decided three cases that address the issue of whether agreements among 
lawyers that create financial disincentives are enforceable.166 A close 
examination of the court’s three opinions suggests that the unfinished 
business doctrine, even when applied to hourly matters, does not violate the 
state’s public policy, which is concerned with attorneys being improperly 
deterred from practicing law. The opinions suggest that Cohen should not 
be read as broadly as the Geron court interpreted the case because the 
doctrine does not improperly deter competition by requiring a former 
partner to pay a penalty or forfeit earnings that belong to the partner. 
 
164 See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the negative externalities that the unfinished business 
doctrine creates. 
165 See Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-competition Agreements While Maintaining the 
Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 915, 934 (2000) (“The client 
who is denied the opportunity to continue a close fiduciary relationship with the restricted lawyer not 
only loses a trusted confidant and counsel, but may also face the cost of educating a new attorney on the 
subject of the representation, a potential loss through delay in the ultimate resolution of the matter while 
a new lawyer takes over, and possibly the need to disclose sensitive confidences to yet another 
individual.”). 
166 Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1995); Denburg v. Parker 
Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 1993); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 
(N.Y. 1989). 
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The first case on restrictive agreements that the New York Court of 
Appeals decided, Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, addressed a clause in a 
partnership agreement that required a withdrawing partner to forfeit his 
interest in accounts receivable if he competed with the firm.167 Relying on 
an ethics rule that proscribes agreements that restrict an attorney’s right to 
practice law, the court held that the forfeiture clause was unenforceable 
because it discouraged partners from continuing to represent clients.168 The 
Geron court relied on Cohen when it held that the unfinished business 
doctrine does not apply to hourly matters, finding that the doctrine is a 
restriction on the practice of law when applied to hourly matters.169 Of 
particular importance, however, is that the Cohen court explicitly 
“caution[ed] against a categorical interpretation or application” of its 
holding.170 
The New York Court of Appeals’ second opinion on restrictive 
agreements, Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl,171 further 
clarified the limits of the ethics rule. The agreement at issue required a 
former partner to pay the firm he left the greater of 12.5% of the partner’s 
earnings in the prior two years or 12.5% of the amount the new firm billed 
clients of the old firm during the ensuing two years.172 As in Cohen, the 
court examined the effect of the restrictive provision (as opposed to its 
intent) and concluded that it “improperly deter[red] competition and thus 
impinge[d] upon clients’ choice of counsel.”173 The key language is 
improperly deter, suggesting that some restrictive provisions that deter are 
enforceable. 
In both Denburg and Cohen, the litigation involved covenants that 
required partners to give something up that they were otherwise entitled to 
under partnership law and in the partnership agreements. In Cohen, that 
was a right to accounts receivable; in Denburg, that was a portion of the 
partner’s prior earnings or the partner’s future earnings. Thus, in both 
cases, the restrictive covenants did not merely deter competition; they 
improperly deterred competition because the agreements sought to take 
away something to which the partners were otherwise entitled. 
A second issue that the Denburg court addressed further supports the 
logic that only restrictive agreements that improperly deter competition are 
unenforceable. Prior to the start of the litigation, the departing partner 
 
167 550 N.E.2d at 410–11. 
168 Id. at 411. The ethics rule at issue paralleled DR 2-108 of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. New York has since revamped its ethics rules to parallel the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. See supra note 104 and accompanying text for the revamped rule. 
169 See supra Part II.B.1. 
170 550 N.E.2d at 413. 
171 624 N.E.2d 995. 
172 Id. at 997. 
173 Id. at 999 (emphasis added). 
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allegedly told another partner at the firm that the partnership could retain 
the balance in his capital account to settle the dispute.174 The departing 
partner contested this allegation, and the Appellate Division held that even 
if the partner entered into an oral settlement agreement, the settlement was 
unenforceable for the same reasons the restrictive covenant was: its effect 
deterred competition, which negatively impacted clients’ choice of 
counsel.175 
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed and held that if there was a 
settlement agreement, it would be enforceable.176 The court reasoned that 
countervailing policy reasons that favor the enforcement of settlement 
agreements require the settlement agreement to be enforced even though 
the restrictive clause was unenforceable.177 Similar to the disclaimer the 
court made in Cohen, it emphasized that agreements giving rise to financial 
disincentives among lawyers “are not per se illegal but depend on the 
particular terms and circumstances.”178 
The New York Court of Appeals adopted similar reasoning again in its 
third case on the issue of financial disincentives. In Hackett v. Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, the court upheld an arbitrator’s award in a 
dispute involving a provision in a law firm partnership agreement that 
required withdrawing partners to forfeit supplemental payments if they left 
the firm and earned income in excess of $100,000 per year.179 The case 
arose after an arbitrator determined that the withdrawing partner was not 
entitled to his supplemental payments.180 The withdrawing partner 
challenged the arbitrator’s decision, and the trial court held that the 
provision in the partnership agreement violated public policy.181 
The Court of Appeals distinguished the provision from the 
anticompetitive covenants in Cohen and Denburg on the grounds that the 
“supplemental payment provision [wa]s not inevitably anticompetitive on 
its face.”182 It explained that the $100,000 threshold applied regardless of 
whether a departing partner earned that much competing with the firm or 
pursuing another lucrative opportunity.183 Finally, the court reiterated its 
reasoning in Denburg—that “anticompetition policy may yield to other 
 
174 Id. at 997. 
175 See id. at 998. 
176 See id. at 1000–02. 
177 See id. 
178 Id. at 1002. 
179 See 654 N.E.2d 95, 97–98 (N.Y. 1995). 
180 Id. at 97. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 101. 
183 See id. 
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public policy concerns,” such as those favoring arbitration, which the 
parties already consented to and underwent.184 
These three cases, when read together, suggest that restrictive 
covenants are anticompetitive and, therefore, unenforceable when they 
improperly deter competition (negatively affecting clients’ right to counsel) 
by requiring a partner to give something up that the partner is otherwise 
entitled to under the partnership agreement or under partnership law—for 
example, forfeiting an interest that the partner is entitled to (as in Cohen), 
or paying a penalty because the partner is competing with the firm by 
continuing to practice law (as in Denburg). Moreover, the latter two 
opinions suggest that Cohen should not be read as broadly as the Geron 
court interpreted the case. In both Denburg and Hackett, though the Court 
of Appeals acknowledged that clauses that improperly deter competition 
are unenforceable, the court recognized that the policy behind the ethics 
rule that proscribes restrictive agreements among attorneys may yield to 
countervailing policy considerations.185 
The unfinished business doctrine arises out of partnership law because 
of policy concerns. It does not exact a penalty or require a partner to 
disgorge earnings that the partner is otherwise entitled to because partners 
wind up a partnership and complete unfinished business for the benefit of 
the partnership. Rather, the doctrine seeks to delineate the scope of 
fiduciary duties among partners when a firm is dissolving. It reduces the 
incentive for partners to compete for the most profitable cases, diminishes 
the likelihood that partners will steal client files so that they may continue 
working on existing client matters for personal gain, and reduces the need 
for judicial intervention.186 Moreover, the point of the doctrine is not to 
deter competition, but rather to reinforce fiduciary duties among partners 
that restrain them from using the partnership to obtain personal gain.187 
Therefore, not all agreements or relationships among partners that may 
have a detrimental effect on client choice are per se unenforceable. Because 
the unfinished business doctrine is a function of partnership law that 
upholds fiduciary duties as a partnership winds up, the doctrine does not 
clash with New York law, the UPA, or RUPA, whether it is applied to 
matters billed by the hour or on contingency. 
B. The Difference Between Hourly and Contingent Fee Matters 
Though the previous section advocates that the unfinished business 
doctrine should apply to hourly matters in the same way that it applies to 
contingent fee matters, this may not be optimal for attorneys and their 
 
184 Id. at 101–02. 
185 See id.; Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1000–02 (N.Y. 1993). 
186 See supra Part I.A.1. 
187 See Robert W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the Duties of 
Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 999 (1998). 
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clients. There are important distinctions between hourly and contingent fee 
matters, and these distinctions make the financial disincentives greater 
when the unfinished business doctrine is applied to hourly matters. 
Contingent fee and hourly billable matters are inherently different. 
Contingency arrangements function as financing devices that allow clients 
to pursue their legal claims without paying out of pocket.188 The 
arrangement is a sort of “risk-sharing joint venture” where the attorney 
assumes the risk that the client will recover nothing.189 Consequently, 
contingent fee agreements compensate for this risk by awarding law firms a 
significant share of a settlement or judgment.190 
The financial disincentives that the unfinished business doctrine 
creates are not as great when a client matter is billed on contingency. The 
reason for this is because if an attorney withdraws from a case billed on 
contingency, the attorney forfeits the right to all compensation associated 
with that matter, regardless of how much time and effort the attorney has 
already spent.191 This makes the case appear more financially appealing 
going forward. In determining whether to continue representing a client 
after a law firm dissolves, the attorney will disregard the total number of 
hours that the attorney already worked on the matter because, unlike with 
hourly matters, the attorney will not be compensated for that time if the 
attorney withdraws. The time, effort, and costs that the attorney already 
expended are sunk costs. Instead, the attorney will consider whether the 
potential contingency fee is sufficient to justify the estimated number of 
hours needed to complete the matter.192 
For example, assume that a contingency fee case is expected to 
recover $10 million and that the attorney handling the case is entitled to 
 
188 Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee when the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 
41 EMORY L.J. 367, 380 (1992). 
189 Id. at 379. 
190 See id. at 379–80. 
191 STEIN & BEATO, supra note 153, § 8:3, at 250. An exception to this rule applies, entitling an 
attorney to quantum meruit compensation, if the attorney had good cause for withdrawing. Id. Although 
Part I.B discussed how an attorney may have good cause to withdraw from unfinished business, see 
supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text, “[t]he existence of grounds for withdrawal does not always 
translate into an attorney’s right to be paid for work performed.” Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69, 71 
(Fla. 1994). One court has held that even though a law firm had good cause for withdrawing when a 
contingent fee case became a financial burden, the law firm was not entitled to recover fees in quantum 
meruit because it “did not have good cause to withdraw justifying compensation.” Bell & Marra, pllc v. 
Sullivan, 6 P.3d 965, 971 (Mont. 2000). Another court held that when an attorney withdraws from a 
contingent fee matter but the client is not at fault, the attorney is not entitled to compensation. See Faro, 
641 So. 2d at 71. Following this line of cases, when a partner withdraws from unfinished business billed 
on contingency, the partner forfeits the right to compensation associated with that matter if the client is 
not at fault. 
192 There are, of course, ethical considerations that the attorney would need to take into account 
before withdrawing. The ethics rules explain when an attorney may withdraw from a case. See supra 
notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
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one-tenth of the 30% contingency fee because the remaining former 
partners of the dissolved firm are entitled to nine-tenths under the 
unfinished business doctrine. The attorney will consider whether it is worth 
the total number of additional hours to finish the case and earn $300,000 
(i.e., one-tenth of the total $3 million contingency fee). Because the 
attorney earns nothing by withdrawing, it becomes irrelevant how much 
time the attorney already spent on the case. The less time needed to 
complete the case, the greater the incentive exists for the attorney to 
continue representing the client. If a case is close to the point of potential 
recovery, it will likely be worthwhile to expend the time to seek the fees 
that the attorney would otherwise forfeit. 
In the hypothetical above, if the attorney only needs to work an 
additional 100 hours on the case, the effective hourly rate is $3000 to the 
attorney and new firm completing the case (since the partner is entitled to 
one-tenth of the $3 million contingency fee). The hourly rate appears high 
because it is irrelevant how many hours the attorney spent on the case 
before the partnership dissolved, considering that the attorney would 
otherwise forfeit the contingency fee by withdrawing. In other words, the 
stopwatch is reset in calculating the earnings per hour going forward for 
unfinished business billed on contingency. In this instance, the unfinished 
business doctrine imposes financial disincentives only if the attorney can 
work on other client matters that yield fees in excess of $3000 per hour. 
As for hourly billable matters, the stopwatch never resets; the hourly 
rate is a constant. If the partner with a 10% interest in a dissolved law firm 
bills out at $500 per hour, the partner’s new firm would only be entitled to 
$50 per hour because the remaining 90% belongs to the other partners of 
the former firm. The disincentive is greater for hourly matters because the 
new firm can never earn more than $50 per hour going forward. Thus, for 
every hour the partner spends on unfinished business, the new firm incurs 
an opportunity cost of $450 since it would be entitled to that much more 
per hour on matters that are not unfinished business. The partner will be 
less inclined to continue working on hourly unfinished business if the 
attorney can work on other matters and bill $500 per hour instead. 
These two scenarios illustrate that a partner may face elevated 
financial disincentives when unfinished business cases are billed by the 
hour. For a contingent fee matter, the effects of sunk costs cause a firm to 
earn more per hour going forward. This may induce a partner to complete 
profitable contingent fee unfinished business. However, for hourly matters, 
a former partner may be incentivized to withdraw from a case because the 
partner would not be forfeiting the possibility of earning a large payout. 
Jewel recognized that an attorney will not be unduly burdened if other 
former partners also continue to work on unfinished business.193 Despite 
 
193 See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18–19 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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this possibility, a free-rider problem exists where each former partner 
prefers working on matters that are not unfinished business but hopes that 
the other former partners will work on unfinished business. Therefore, even 
though the unfinished business doctrine should apply to matters billed by 
the hour and on contingency, the doctrine as it stands is not optimal. 
C. A Proposed Statutory Solution 
Part I.B discussed how the unfinished business doctrine may 
negatively affect clients’ choice of counsel and suggested that law firms 
may be wary of taking on new partners of dissolved firms because of the 
liability that the unfinished business doctrine imposes. The previous section 
argued that the unfinished business doctrine creates greater financial 
disincentives that further impair client choice when the doctrine is applied 
to hourly matters as compared to matters billed on contingency. This 
section proposes a solution to ameliorate the negative externalities that the 
unfinished business doctrine creates in New York and other UPA 
jurisdictions. 
As compared to the majority of states, New York is behind the times; 
its partnership law is still based on the UPA, a century-old model statute.194 
RUPA, the revised act from 1997, eliminated the no-compensation rule, 
instead allowing a partner to earn reasonable compensation for completing 
unfinished business when a partnership agreement is otherwise silent on the 
matter.195 This is a step in the right direction because when a partner—or a 
new firm that the partner joins—is entitled to reasonable compensation, the 
partner will have a greater incentive to complete a client’s unfinished 
business, providing continuity for the client’s representation. Moreover, a 
firm taking on a new partner will be less wary of unfinished business 
because the new firm will be entitled to reasonable compensation. 
Reasonable compensation, therefore, reduces the externalities of the 
unfinished business doctrine that infringe clients’ choice of counsel. It 
benefits attorneys and law firms completing unfinished business, as well as 
clients, who are able to retain their choice of counsel. For default 
partnership law, reasonable compensation is an appropriate measure 
because it requires the fees that exceed reasonable compensation to be 
shared with partners of the former partnership. This is consistent with the 
principle that partners owe fiduciary duties to one another, including while 
they wind up the partnership for the benefit of the partners.196 
Rather than revamp the entire body of New York partnership law, 
which would be time-consuming to say the least, the legislature could 
 
194 See supra note 16. 
195 RUPA, supra note 16, § 401(h); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (comparing the 
difference between the UPA’s no-compensation rule and RUPA’s allowance for reasonable 
compensation). 
196 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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simply strike out a single word in the statute, thereby allowing partners to 
earn reasonable compensation for completing unfinished business. The 
statute would read: “No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the 
partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to 
reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership 
affairs.”197 By eliminating the word surviving, a partner is no longer limited 
to earning reasonable compensation for winding up the partnership when 
another partner dies.198 Alternatively, the legislature could replace the entire 
sentence with the updated language from RUPA, which states: “A partner 
is not entitled to remuneration for services performed for the partnership, 
except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the 
business of the partnership.”199 Either approach suffices as an effective 
“quick fix” to New York’s antiquated statute. 
Allowing reasonable compensation will alleviate but not eliminate all 
negative externalities that the doctrine may impose. Because reasonable 
compensation is a subjective measure, what constitutes reasonable 
compensation and what constitutes excessive compensation may become 
the subject of a lawsuit. For example, a former partner or a bankruptcy 
trustee of a dissolved firm may sue former partners and the law firms that 
they join for profits earned on unfinished business that exceed reasonable 
compensation.200 While this remains an issue that partners and the law firms 
they join face, alternative default law is more problematic. Entitling a 
partner to anything less than reasonable compensation for winding up the 
unfinished business of a law firm infringes clients’ choice of counsel and a 
former partner’s prospects of becoming a partner at another law firm. In 
contrast, entitling a partner to anything more than reasonable compensation 
vitiates the concept of a partnership by undermining the fiduciary duty that 
partners owe one another to wind up the firm for the benefit of the partners. 
Of course, law firms could also be more diligent by updating their 
partnership agreements to specify how fees from unfinished business 
should be allocated if the firm dissolves. Adding a Jewel waiver while the 
law firm is solvent will allow law firms to circumvent the unfinished 
business doctrine.201 
 
197 Cf. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 40(6) (McKinney 2006); UPA, supra note 16, § 18(f). 
198 The rationale for allowing surviving partners to earn reasonable compensation is that the burden 
of winding up the partnership falls entirely on the surviving partners. Weinstein, supra note 33, at 876. 
199 RUPA, supra note 16, § 401(h). 
200 See, e.g., In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2013 WL 951706, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 11, 2013) (explaining that bankrupt firm Heller Ehrman LLP “is challenging the right of 
[d]efendants to keep profits (measured after allowing reasonable compensation) for completing Heller’s 
unfinished business”). 
201 See generally HILLMAN, supra note 55, § 4.6.1.1, at 4:67–:69 (discussing Jewel waivers). See 
supra note 125 for an example of a Jewel waiver. However, if a Jewel waiver is added while a law firm 
is insolvent, it may be deemed a fraudulent transfer. See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 
LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 338–48 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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As it currently stands, the judiciary is not in a position to engineer the 
UPA’s no-compensation rule because the legislative intent of the rule is 
unambiguous: partners are only entitled to reasonable compensation for 
winding up a partnership after the death of another partner. Further, the no-
compensation rule is not contrary to public policy because it does not 
improperly deter competition.202 Thus, it is up to the legislatures of New 
York and other UPA jurisdictions to modernize their statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of the unfinished business doctrine is controversial 
from the perspectives of both the client and the former partner. The 
doctrine may negatively affect clients’ choice of counsel because it may 
make other matters more financially appealing to attorneys, thereby 
inducing an attorney to withdraw from unfinished business. From the 
standpoint of a former partner, the doctrine may act like a restrictive 
agreement that creates a financial disincentive for the partner to continue 
working on unfinished business. The doctrine may also impair a former 
partner’s prospects of becoming a partner at a new firm because a firm may 
not wish to share earnings or assume liability for completing unfinished 
business that the partner brings. The externalities affecting client choice 
may become elevated when the doctrine is applied to hourly matters 
because an attorney who works on a contingent fee matter would otherwise 
forfeit the contingency fee if the attorney withdrew. 
Despite the controversies surrounding the doctrine, it does exist for 
policy reasons—to ensure that partners fulfill their fiduciary duties in all 
dealings with the partnership, to prevent animosity among partners when a 
law firm begins to crumble, and to reduce the need for judicial intervention. 
Because of these countervailing policy considerations, the doctrine does 
not improperly deter competition, whether it applies to matters billed by the 
hour or on contingency. Thus, the unfinished business doctrine does not 
violate the ethics rules of the legal profession or contravene public policy. 
Unless partners of a law firm have agreed otherwise, the unfinished 
business doctrine should apply with equal force to hourly and contingent 
fee matters. 
The New York legislature and other UPA jurisdictions should 
eliminate the no-compensation rule and instead allow partners to earn 
reasonable compensation for winding up a dissolved firm. Doing so will 
mitigate the negative externalities of the unfinished business doctrine. 
  
 
202 See supra Part III.A. 
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